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The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989: The Effect of the “Self- 
Affecting” Theory on Financial Institutions 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine the government prosecuting someone for attempted 
murder after that person failed to commit suicide. The defendant might 
say that the government is converting a statute designed to shield 
individuals from other’s criminal behavior into one that penalizes him 
for conduct “affecting” himself.1  In response, the government, using   
the attempted murder statute, argues that “affect” has long been 
considered a reflexive verb that includes effects an individual may 
produce on himself.2 Therefore, the government asserts that attempted 
murder statute should extend to prosecuting failed suicides. 
The illustration above may seem like an absurd hypothetical, but 
the concept of the hypothetical has become a reality for JPMorgan,3 
Citigroup,4   Bank  of  New  York  Mellon  (“BNYM”),5   and  Bank  of 
 
1. See Bank of New York Mellon’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to 
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 10, United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 
941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 6969 (LAK)) [hereinafter 
BNYM’s Mem.] (claiming that the DOJ’s reading of FIRREA is contrary to its intended 
purpose, which is to protect federally insured financial institutions from fraud by others). 
2. See Memorandum of Law of the United States in Opposition to Defendants’ 
Motions to Dismiss at 17, United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 6969 (LAK)) (stating the word “affect” has long been 
used to describe conduct that one may have upon oneself). 
3. See Brian Collins, Why Suit Against JPM’s $13B Settlement Faces Uphill Battle, 
AM. BANKER (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_34/why-suit- 
against-jpms-13b-settlement-faces-uphill-battle-1065718-1.html (describing the settlement 
reached between JPMorgan and the DOJ). 
4. See Victoria Finkle & Joe Adler, Three Takeaways from Citi’s $7B Mortgage 
Settlement, AM. BANKER (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_134/three-takeaways-from-citis-7b-mortgage- 
settlement-1068646-1.html (reporting that this settlement will allow the DOJ to set its sight 
solely on Bank of America, the prominence of FIRREA, and the DOJ can still pursue 
criminal charges against U.S. banks if FIRREA fails). 
5. See Brent Ylvisaker, FIRREA Civil Money Penalties, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 
(May 16, 2013), http://www.dorsey.com/eu_fsr_firrea_civil_money_penalties/ (describing 
how the Self-Affecting Theory has allowed the DOJ to overcome Bank of New York 
Mellon’s motion to dismiss). 
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America.6 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has strong-armed these 
financial institutions7 into massive settlements for engaging  in 
fraudulent conduct that has “affected” the institution itself.8 The “Self- 
Affecting Theory,” proffered by the DOJ, allows a self-inflicted wound 
to trigger civil penalties.9 The DOJ anchors the legality of the Self- 
Affecting Theory to section 951 of the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”),10 which is 
codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1833a.11 Section 1833a affords the 
DOJ a ten-year statute of limitations to bring fourteen broad criminal 
offenses, including mail and wire fraud, under a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.12 When facing FIRREA penalties, financial 
institutions have yet to succeed in getting cases dismissed.13 
This Note addresses why the Self-Affecting Theory 
misinterprets § 1833a. This Note argues that in cases where the DOJ 
could bring, but is unwilling or unable to bring, criminal actions, a 
federally insured financial institution should not be held civilly liable 
under § 1833a for engaging in  fraudulent conduct “affecting” that same 
 
 
6. See Patricia Hurtado, Bank of America’s Countrywide Ordered to Pay $1.3 Billion, 
BLOOMGBERG (July 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-30/bank-of- 
america-s-countrywide-ordered-to-pay-1-3-billion.html (describing how Bank of America, 
as successor to Countrywide Financial Corp., has been ordered to pay nearly $1.3 billion in 
FIRREA penalties); Ben Protess & Michael Corkery, Bank of America Offers U.S. Biggest 
Settlement in History, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 6, 2014, 9:58 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/bank-of-america-nears-17-billion-settlement-over- 
mortgages/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.html (describing the record settling settlement 
between the DOJ and Bank of America). 
7. For simplicity, in this Note a “financial institution” refers to all federally insured 
depository institutions unless otherwise specified.   A “financial institution” is defined in 18 
U.S.C. § 20 (2012). 
8. See BENTON CAMPBELL ET AL., LATHAM & WATKINS, CLIENT ALERT: EXPANDING 
FIRREA LIABILITY FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
DEVELOPMENTS [UPDATE] (Oct. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.lw.com/search?searchText=client+alert+1601 (discussing progression of the 
Self-Affecting Theory through case law). 
9. See Peter J. Henning, Judge’s Ruling Against Bank of America Showcases a Novel 
Enforcement Strategy, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 4, 2014, 11:32 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/the-governments-big-stick/ (describing how the 
DOJ has rediscovered FIRREA in order to assign liability to the events leading up to and 
causing the 2008 financial crisis). 
10. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
11. FIRREA § 951, 103 Stat. at 501 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §  1833a 
(2012)). 
12.    18 U.S.C. § 1833a(c). 
13. CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 8. 
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institution.14 FIRREA does not define what it means to “affect[] a 
federally    insured   financial   institution.”15 Congressional   intent 
demonstrates that Congress enacted § 1833a in response to the  
pervasive insider abuse and fraud of the savings and loan crisis (“S&L 
Crisis”) and was not intended to punish financial institutions for losses 
incurred from their own conduct.16 Under this perspective, the Self- 
Affecting Theory presents an impermissible reading of § 1833a.17 
The analysis proceeds in five parts. Part II examines the 
historical circumstances leading to the passage of FIRREA.18 Part III 
explains FIRREA’s usefulness as a tool for the U.S. government.19 Part 
IV describes the Self-Affecting Theory and how the courts and 
government have addressed it.20 Part V addresses why the Self- 
Affecting Theory is inconsistent with the meaning of FIRREA.21  Part  
VI concludes by proposing recommendations for  financial  institutions 
to assess their exposure to potential FIRREA claims.22 
II. INSIDER ABUSE AND FRAUD PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN CAUSING 
THE S&L CRISIS 
 
Congress  enacted  FIRREA  in  response  to  the  S&L  Crisis.23 
 
14. See United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 443 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (addressing upon first impression whether a federally insured financial 
institution may be civilly liable under § 1833a for conducting “affecting” that same 
institution). 
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a; see also Memorandum of Law of the United States in 
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 30, United States v. Countrywide Fin. 
Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (Apr. 1, 2013) (No. 12 Civ. 1422 (JSR)) (Countrywide I) 
(arguing that since FIRREA does not define what “affects” a financial institution, the court 
should look to similar language in other provisions of § 1833a). 
16. See H.R.  REP. NO. 101-54(I),  at 301  (1989),  reprinted  in  1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.  86, 
97; 136 CONG. REC. E2672-01, 1990 WL 111608, at 1 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of 
the Hon. Nicholas Mavroules of Massachusetts) (“[T]he savings and loan scandal  has 
rapidly become a powerful example of flagrant abuse of trust and leadership. Financial 
criminals must be brought to justice and their inequities should not be paid for by the 
American people.”). 
17. See BNYM’s Mem., supra note 1. 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
21. See infra Part V. 
22. See infra Part VI. 
23. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT FAILURES—COSTLY  FAILURES 
RESULTED FROM REGULATORY VIOLATIONS AND UNSAFE PRACTICES 10 (1989) [hereinafter 
1989 GAO REPORT] (reporting that serious misconduct by senior insiders or outsiders has 
contributed to insolvencies of most banks, savings and loan, and credit unions). 
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Although the S&L Crisis can be causally linked to a variety of factors, 
insider abuse and fraud24 served as a major catalyst.25 Individuals like 
Erwin Hansen,26 Don Dixon,27 and Charles Keating,28 defrauded their 
financial institutions in order to achieve both institutional and personal 
gain.29 Upon specific examination of twenty-six failed thrifts between 
1985 and 1987, the Government Accounting Office (“GAO”)30 noted 
that each of the failed thrifts involved individuals that engaged in 
conduct constituting fraud and insider abuse.31 On an aggregate level, 
serious insider misconduct contributed to the insolvencies of at least 
75% of all failed institutions in the S&L Crisis.32 These failed 
institutions often skirted regulatory supervision by engaging in “land 
flips,” which involve two or more groups selling properties back and 
forth in order to artificially inflate the face value of the real property.33 
 
24. Insider abuse and fraud refers to a wide range of conduct by high-ranking 
employees and directors of financial institutions, who committed unlawful acts with the 
intent of personal gain without regard for the safety and soundness of the institution they 
control. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1137, at 2 n.5 (1984) (defining fraud and insider abuse). For 
example, insider abuse may include conduct such as high-risk and speculative ventures; 
payment of dividends or bonuses at a time when the entity is close to or is insolvent; or  
when the insider has breached fiduciary duties to customers. 1989 GAO REPORT, supra note 
23, at 7– 9. Additionally, insider has been defined as a person who by virtue of their  
position is able to influence the operations or decisions within a bank. OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN EVALUATION OF THE FACTORS 
CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKS 33 (1988). Insider abuse includes legal 
violations, but they are not a necessary element. Id. Furthermore,  insider  abuse  may 
include actions or failure to take action where the bank is harmed, takes on additional risk,  
or loses an opportunity. Id. 
25. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), supra note 16. 
26. Erwin Hansen took over Centennial Savings and Loan, which collapsed in 1985 at 
a cost to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation of an estimated $160 million. 
See KITTY CALAVITA ET AL., BIG MONEY CRIME: FRAUD AND POLITICS IN THE SAVINGS AND 
LOAN CRISIS 24 (1997). 
27. Don Dixon operated Vernon Savings and Loan in Texas. When Vernon was taken 
over in 1987, 96% of its loans were in default. The resolution of Vernon cost taxpayers $1.3 
billion.  See id. at 25. 
28. Charles Keating purchased Lincoln Savings and Loan in 1984. After being shut- 
down in 1989, it cost more than $3 billion to resolve.  See id. at 26–27. 
29. See id. at 23 (describing the most notorious insiders from the S&L Crisis). 
30. On July 7, 2004, the GAO’s legal name was changed from the Government 
Accounting Office to the Government Accountability Office. See GAO Human Capital 
Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811 (2004). 
31. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT FAILURES: COSTLY FAILURES RESULTED 
FROM REGULATORY VIOLATIONS AND UNSAFE PRACTICES 23 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 GAO 
REPORT] (detailing the extent that fraud and insider abuse played in the S&L Crisis). 
32.   H.R. REP. NO. 101-982, at 5 (1990). 
33. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-48, BANK AND THRIFT 
CRIMINAL FRAUD: THE FEDERAL COMMITMENT COULD BE BROADENED  2 (1993) [hereinafter 
  
 
 
2015] FIRREA & THE SELF-AFFECTING THEORY 267 
The end result of the practice typically benefitted insiders, senior 
management, or other outside affiliates.34 
Even though a lone fraudster may have significantly damaged 
his respective financial institution through an isolated event, the 
fraudulent conduct of failed institutions typically extended to senior 
management.35 Inert boards of directors,36 usually dominated by one or 
two individuals, bypassed internal controls and allowed their financial 
institutions to pursue risky investments.37 Some financial institutions 
pursued excessive loan growth with the view that the Federal Savings 
and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) would insure their deposits 
in the event borrowers could not repay the loans and the institutions 
failed.38     The  FSLIC  had  statutory authority to  liquidate  failed  thrift 
 
 
1993 GAO REPORT] (explaining that “land flips” were used in order to inflate the value of 
real estate prices). 
34. See 1989 GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 45–46 (detailing the Federal Housing 
Loan Bank Board’s description of a typical conduct constituting insider abuse and fraud). 
35. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1137, at 102 (1984) (stating that individual insider abuse and 
fraud is typically representative of a larger scheme of insider abuse, self-dealing, and gross 
mismanagement); Renae V. Stevens, Insider Abuse and Criminal Misconduct in Financial 
Institutions: A Crisis, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 222, 227 (1999) (explaining that well- 
managed institutions that have strong internal controls usually continue successful operation 
when facing economic downturn). 
36. For simplicity, in this Note “directors” refers to an “institution-affiliated party” 
within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(1) (2012), which is “any director, officer, 
employee, or controlling stockholder (other than a bank holding company or savings and 
loan holding company) of, or agent for, an insured depository institution.” 
37. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN 
EVALUATION OF THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKS 7 (1988) 
(stating that management-driven weaknesses played a significant role in the decline of 90% 
of the failed institutions examined); see also Fraud and Abuse by Insiders, Borrowers, & 
Appraisers in the California Thrift Industry: Hearing Before The Commerce, Consumer,  
and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 100th Cong. 122 
(1987) (statement of Charles A. Deardorff, Deputy Director, Agency Group Federal Home 
Loan Bank of San Francisco). 
38. See 1989 GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 17–18. The report offered the following 
example of one S&L institutions’ excessive loan growth: 
 
At one failed thrift, the president of the thrift initiated a construction 
lending program in 1980 whereby the thrift provided 100 percent of the 
financing in return for interest and a profit participation. The board of 
directors did not give serious review or consideration to the amount of 
capital involved or to the necessary staffing, record keeping, and 
monitoring requirements prior to adopting the new lending program. 
Moreover, without board oversight and control, the president and other 
senior management simply operated the program as they wished.  
Despite the fact that since 1982, examination reports pointed out 
problems  with  the  new  lending  program,  the  problems  were  not 
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institutions and pay off insured accounts up to $100,000.39 By 1987, 
however, the FSLIC had become insolvent and required a $10.825 
billion recapitalization plan40 under the Competitive Equality Banking 
Act of 1987 (“CEBA”).41 Unfortunately, CEBA insufficiently covered 
the FSLIC losses when 535 banks and savings institutions failed in 
1989,42  which prompted the enactment of FIRREA.43 
In response to the fraud and abuse that contributed to the S&L 
Crisis, Congress enacted FIRREA to strengthen criminal and civil 
penalties for “defrauding or otherwise damaging financial institutions 
and depositors.”44 FIRREA also sought to help depositors regain 
confidence in the financial system by deterring fraudulent behavior by 
 
 
 
 
corrected. In 1983, over $500 million (approximately 16% of  the  
thrift’s assets) had been committed to the program. The thrift’s board of 
directors dismissed the president in 1984 but still made little progress in 
correct the previously cited deficiencies. Bank Board documents noted 
that, in the aggregate, ‘substantial losses’ were incurred as a result of the 
lending program and additional losses were expected. 
 
Id. 
39. See Jeremy S. Westin, Contract Repudiation and Claim Determination Under FIRREA: 
The Need for FDIC Restraint and Legislative Reform, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 557, 559 
(1993) (describing the FSLIC’s authority to payoff insured accounts up to $100,000). 
40. See Current Conditions in the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Budget, 100th Cong. 20 (1988) (statement of M. Danny 
Wall, Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, accompanied by Larry White and Roger 
Martin) [hereinafter Current Conditions]. 
41. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.). The purpose is “[t]o regulate nonbank 
banks, impose a moratorium on certain securities and insurance activities by banks, 
recapitalize the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, allow emergency 
interstate bank acquisitions, streamline credit union operations, regulate consumer check 
holds, and for other purposes.” Id. 
42. Associated Press, Bank Failures Dip, For Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, at 42 
(describing the total number of failed institutions in 1989 and comparing it to the number of 
failed institutions in 1990). 
43. See Remarks on Signing the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement 
Act of 1989, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1226 (Aug. 9, 1989) (“This legislation [will] . . . 
safeguard and stabilize America’s financial system . . . . And moreover, it says to tens of 
millions of S&L depositors: You will not be the victim of others’ mistakes.”). 
44. H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 305 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 101; see 
also Mark David Wallace, Life in the Boardroom After FIRREA: A Revisionist Approach to 
Corporate Governance in Insured Depository Institutions, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1187, 1189 
(1992) (stating that after FIRREA was enacted, William Seidman, former Chairman of the 
FDIC predicted there would be over 100,000 lawsuits attempting to place liability on 
corporate officers and directors for the failure of individual thrift institutions). 
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individuals and managers.45 Specifically, Congress viewed Title IX, 
which includes § 1833a, as a necessary response to prevent  insider 
abuse and fraud from occurring in the future.46 After signing FIRREA 
into law, President H. W. Bush stated “[b]eginning today, penalties for 
wrongdoing by officers and directors of insured institutions will be 
increased up to $1 million per day.”47 
The prosecutions stemming from the S&L Crisis bolster the 
view that FIRREA was enacted to deter individuals from damaging 
financial institutions and their depositors.48 Between  1988 and 1992,  
the DOJ charged and convicted over 2,500 financial institution fraud 
offenders.49 A majority of the convictions rested on the individual 
violating, or conspiring to violate, the predicate offenses listed under 
§ 1833a(c).50 While the prosecution statistics fail to show any cases 
involving a financial institution affecting itself, the statistics readily 
demonstrate DOJ actions against individuals.51 For example, special 
government task forces sentenced nearly 1,700 bank officials to prison 
terms with a conviction rate of nearly 96%.52    In deciding whether to 
 
 
45. See Current Conditions, supra note 40, at 24 (statement of M. Danny Wall, Chairman, 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, accompanied by Larry White and Roger Martin) (“A fact 
of critical importance, sometimes overlooked in the kind of historical review I have just 
outlined, is that it is the function of a system of deposit insurance to protect depositors, not 
the management of thrift institutions and not the stockholders of thrifts that are structured as 
stock associations.”). 
46. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 23 n.17 (1993) (stating that the House of 
Representatives report accompanying FIRREA demonstrates the belief that Title IX of 
FIRREA was “absolutely essential to respond to serious epidemic of financial insider abuse 
and criminal misconduct and to prevent its recurrence in the future”). 
47. Remarks on Signing of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement 
Act of 1989, supra note 43 (emphasis added). 
48. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 104–05 (stating that the Special Counsel 
appointed by President George H. W. Bush sought to “emphasize the need to proceed with 
the coordinated two-pronged effort to put the crooks in jail and take their money back for 
the public.”). 
49. See id. at 76 (reporting that between October 1, 1988, and June 30, 1992, the DOJ 
charged 3,270 defendants and convicted 2,603 defendants with a conviction rate close to 96 
percent). 
50. Compare id. at 14 (noting the commonly applied banking statutes in FIRREA 
prosecutions) with 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c) (2012) (listing the predicate offenses for civil 
liability). 
51. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 69–84 (discussing the prosecution statistics for 
financial institution fraud offenders). 
52. See id. at 77–80 (listing examples of successful prosecutions against individuals and 
their accompanying criminal and civil penalties); see also Gretchen Morgenson & Louise 
Story, In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14prosecute.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
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prosecute, the DOJ considered numerous factors, such as “whether the 
offense is part of a systemic problem; whether an insider (i.e., an 
officer, director, or senior employee) committed the offense; whether 
the applicable statute of limitations is about to expire; [and] whether 
there is a reasonable, available alternative to criminal prosecution.”53 In 
light of such considerations, the DOJ elected to prosecute individuals 
and not financial institutions under § 1833a.54 
III. THE BENEFITS OF FIRREA AS AN ENFORCEMENT TOOL 
 
The DOJ has been aggressively using § 1833a in pursuing civil 
liability against financial institutions in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis.55 Section 1833a permits the Attorney General, acting through the 
DOJ, to initiate actions to recover monetary penalties against persons or 
entities that have allegedly committed, or that have allegedly conspired 
to commit, certain predicate criminal offenses.56 As of February 2015, 
the financial institutions being prosecuted under § 1833a have failed in 
their efforts to dismiss cases based on the argument that the Self- 
Affecting Theory is contrary to the literal reading of § 1833a.57 The  
DOJ has proffered the Self-Affecting Theory under § 1833a because the 
statute offers the following five advantages: (1) a preponderance of the 
evidence standard; (2) fourteen predicate criminal offenses; (3) a ten- 
year statute of limitations; (4) the use of administrative subpoenas; and 
(5) stiff penalties that apply to each violation.58 
 
 
53.1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 20 n.15. 
54. See id. at 77 (listing some of the major fraud cases that the DOJ has successfully 
prosecuted, which only include individuals being prosecuted). 
55. See Thomas P. Vartanian et al., Enforcement Actions Continue Three-Year Decline; 
DOJ Emerges as Major Player, 102 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 947, 948 (May 20, 
2014) (arguing that the DOJ has become a “de facto banking regulator” by using § 1833a). 
56. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12 
U.S.C. § 1833a (2012); see also Mary Gail Gearns, Legal Alert: Rakoff Decision Supports 
Expanded Use of FIRREA as an Enforcement Tool, BINGHAM (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.bingham.com/Alerts/2013/08/Rakoff-Decision-Supports-Expanded-Use-of- 
FIRREA. 
57. Erik Larson, BofA Must Face U.S. Suits Over Mortgage-Securities Fraud, BLOOMBERG 
(June 20, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-20/bofa-must-face-u-s-suit- 
over-mortgage-securities-fraud.html. 
58. Reid J. Schar & Ramon Villalpando, Questions Abound over Scope of FIRREA Liability, 
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2013, 12:52 PM), 
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/12384/original/Schar_Villalpando_Law360.pdf 
?1382982466. 
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A. Preponderance of the Evidence Standard 
 
Section 1833a is a hybrid statute that bases civil liability on the 
DOJ’s ability to prove criminal violations under a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.59 Since FIRREA actions are brought as civil 
proceedings, § 1833a applies a preponderance of the evidence standard 
to the enumerated fourteen predicate criminal offenses rather than the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.60 The lower burden of proof in  
civil actions allows the DOJ to pursue enforcement for fraud that would 
not ordinarily rise to the criminal standard.61 Thus, the DOJ will likely 
choose to bring civil action when it does not have enough compelling 
evidence to meet the criminal burden of proof.62 
The DOJ initially brought, however, criminal fraud charges 
against two senior managers at Bear Stearns in  2008.63  The  DOJ 
alleged that by 2007 the two managers were aware of investments on  
the verge of collapse, and instead of warning investors about their 
deteriorating condition, the managers misrepresented the funds in order 
to limit investor withdrawals.64 Nevertheless, the fund collapsed in June 
2007 and its investors lost $1.6 billion.65 The jury found reasonable 
doubt on every charge and found the two managers not guilty of the 
 
 
59. See Opinion and Order at 5, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12-CV-1422 
(JSR), 2014 WL 3734122 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014) (Countrywide III). 
60. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f) (“In a civil action to recover civil penalties under this section, 
the Attorney General must establish the right to recovery by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”); see also John R. Rowlett, The Chilling Effect of the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 and the Bank Fraud Prosecution Act of 
1990: Has Congress Gone Too Far?, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 239, 246 (1992) (predicting that the 
DOJ will bring more claims under FIRREA because of the lower burden of proof). 
61. See Andrew W. Schilling, Understanding FIRREA’s Reach: When Does Fraud ‘Affect’ 
a Financial Institution, 99 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 186, 186 (July 24, 2012) 
(describing the various benefits of having a lower burden of proof in a civil trial). 
62. See Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement Response to the 
S&L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S155, S179 (1991) (stating that the civil proceeding in 
such a case is basically a criminal proceeding without certain protections, such as the 
presumption of innocence). 
63. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Senior Managers of Failed Bear Stearns 
Hedge Fund Indicted on Conspiracy and Fraud Charges (June 19, 2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2008/2008jun19.html. 
64. See William D. Cohan, How the Scapegoats Escaped, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at 
A35 (describing how the Bear Stearns case was tried). 
65. See David Goldman, Former Bear Stearns Execs Not Guilty, CNNMONEY.COM (Nov. 
11, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/10/news/companies/bear_stearns_case/ (detailing 
the jury verdicts). 
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alleged crime.66 The DOJ committed two errors in its prosecution.67 
First, the prosecution used emails from the two managers’ accounts that, 
when viewed holistically, were highly ambiguous as to proving 
fraudulent intent.68 Second, the assistant U.S. attorney tried to 
preemptively classify the defendants’ as deceitful Wall Street financiers, 
and he openly accused them of lying in his opening statement.69 The 
DOJ experienced that the criminal burden of proving fraudulent intent 
would present a difficult task and that it might have to build a new 
litigation strategy.70 
Satisfying the burden of proof for criminal fraud charges proves 
difficult partly because of the complicated nature of the transactions 
underlying the 2008 financial crisis.71 To succeed in a criminal action, 
the DOJ must usually prove specific intent as a necessary element and 
have substantial evidence to reach the beyond a reasonable  doubt 
burden of proof.72 In United States v. Countrywide Financial Corp.,73  
the DOJ alleged that Countrywide Financial Corporation74 had 
perpetrated a scheme to defraud the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (“Fannie Mae”)75  and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Group 
 
 
 
66. Cohan, supra note 64 (quoting a juror who said, “We just didn’t feel that the case had 
been proven”). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. See Amir Efrati & Peter Lattman, U.S. Loses Bear Fraud Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 
2009, at A1 (explaining how the DOJ lost the Bear Stearns case and implications that it 
might have in the future). 
71. See Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, The ‘Civil-izing’ of White Collar Criminal 
Enforcement, 249 N.Y. L.J. 1, 2–3 (May 7, 2013) (suggesting reasons why the DOJ has not 
brought more criminal actions for conduct attributable to the 2008 financial crisis). 
72. See 1989 GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 9. 
73. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(Countrywide I). 
74. Countrywide Financial Corporation includes Countrywide Bank, FSB and Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc. See Second Amended Complaint of the United States and Jury Trial 
Demanded at 51–53, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 6, 2013) (No. 12 Civ. 1422 (JSR)) [hereinafter Countrywide Compl.] 
75. Fannie Mae is “the leading source of residential mortgage credit in the U.S. secondary 
market,” and is tasked with establishing industry standards, such as “manag[ing] credit risk, 
build[ing] new infrastructure to ensure a liquid and efficient market, and facilitate[ing] the 
collection and reporting of data for accurate financial reporting and improved risk 
management.” Who Is Fannie Mae Today?, FANNIE MAE, 
http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/about-us/company-overview/about-fm.html (last updated 
Nov. 6, 2014). 
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(“Freddie Mac”)76 in connection with Countrywide’s residential 
mortgage lending business.77 Under the criminal burden of proof, the 
DOJ would need to sufficiently allege factual circumstances that  
specific individuals had knowingly intended to violate the criminal 
offenses.78 Whereas the civil burden of proof allowed the  DOJ  to 
simply prove that the existence of the fraudulent scheme was more 
probable than its nonexistence.79 The DOJ prevailed on its civil claim. 
Countrywide was found guilty after a jury trial, and Judge Jed S. Rakoff 
ordered Countrywide to pay $1.2 billion in FIRREA penalties.80 
 
B. Fourteen Predicate Criminal Actions 
 
In addition to the favorable burden of proof, FIRREA allows the 
DOJ to prosecute an alleged violator under fourteen predicate criminal 
actions.81 Section 1833a separates the fourteen criminal offenses into 
two separate categories.82 The first category comprises nine of the 
predicate offenses and deals specifically with banks and other financial 
 
76. Freddie Mac ensures that “financial institutions have mortgage money to lend[,] make[s] 
it easier for consumers to afford a decent house or apartment[, and] stabilize[s] residential 
mortgage markets in times of financial crisis[.]” Our Business, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/our_business/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
77. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 2. 
78. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1069, 1072 (1970) (affirming the New 
York Court of Appeals’ observation that “ ‘a person accused of a crime . . . would be at a 
severe disadvantage . . . if he could be adjudged guilty . . . on the strength of the same 
evidence as would suffice in a criminal case’ ”); see also CHARLES DOYLE, MAIL AND WIRE 
FRAUD: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 5 (2011) (stating for both mail fraud 
and wire, “intent to defraud requires a willful act by the defendant with the intent to deceive 
or cheat, usually for the purpose of getting financial gain for one’s self or causing financial 
loss to another”) (citing United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Phipps, 595 F.3d 243, 245–46 (2010) (“Mail and wire fraud are both specific intent 
crimes that require the Government to prove that a defendant knew the scheme involved 
false representations.”); United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
79. Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the- 
Evidence Standard, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983). 
80. See Opinion and Order at 19, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12-CV-1422 
(JSR), 2014 WL 3734122 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014) (Countrywide III) (directing Bank of 
America, which is Countrywide’s successor, to pay the nearly $1.3 billion FIRREA 
penalty). 
81. Joe Adler, DOJ to Continue Big-Bank Suits Despite B of A Decision, AM. BANKER (Apr. 
3, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_65/doj-to-continue-big-bank-suits- 
despite-b-of-a-decision-1066676-1.html (describing the broad charges that may be brought 
against an alleged violator). 
82. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 
12 U.S.C. § 1833a(a)(c)(1)–(3) (2012). 
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institutions.83 Under these offenses, the DOJ does not have to prove 
anything beyond the offense itself.84 The second category, however, 
contains the remaining five offenses, is broader in scope than the first 
category, and the DOJ is required to prove that the offense “affect[ed] a 
federally insured depository institution.”85 The mail fraud86 and wire 
fraud87 statutes, which belong to the second category containing the 
“affecting” language, are the most utilized by the DOJ due in large part 
to their broad construction and interpretations.88 
The DOJ has largely utilized the mail fraud89 and wire fraud90 
offenses under § 1833a(c)(2) to trigger the Self-Affecting Theory.91 In 
making out a prima facie case for mail or wire fraud, the prosecution 
must show that the defendant (1) created a scheme to defraud, (2) for 
purposes of obtaining money or property, and (3) used the mail or wires 
in furtherance of that scheme.92 Additionally, the DOJ must present 
proof that the defendant acted knowingly with “specific intent to  
deceive or cheat, usually for the purpose of getting financial gain for 
one’s self or causing financial loss to another.”93 The DOJ  has  
struggled with proving the requisite intent of the high-ranking officers 
 
83. § 1833a(c)(1), (3). 
84. See Edwin L. Fountain et al., FIRREA Civil Money Penalties: The Government’s 
Rediscovered Weapon Against Financial Fraud, 36 SEC. REFORM ACT LITIG. REP. 9, 9 
(2013) (discussing the predicate offenses under FIRREA and what are the proper pleading 
requirements). 
85. Id.  (emphasis  added). 
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
87. § 1343. 
88. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint of the United States and Jury Trial Demanded ¶¶ 
182–85, United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
[hereinafter BNYM Compl.] (alleging that from 2000 through 2011, BNYM knowingly 
executed a scheme and artifice to defraud, using interstate mail carriers and interstate wire, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343); Second Amended Complaint of the United 
States and Jury Trial Demanded ¶¶ 167–73, United States v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 12 Civ. 
7527 (JMF) (JFC) (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Wells Fargo Compl.] (alleging that Wells 
Fargo submitted false certifications and false claims to HUD using the mails and wires in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, and 1343.”); Countrywide Compl., supra note 61, ¶¶ 218– 
22 (alleging that from 2006 to 2010 Countrywide knowingly and fraudulently obtained 
money from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac using interstate mail carriers and interstate wires, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343). 
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
90. § 1343. 
91. See documents cited supra note 88. 
92. United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 461 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing McNally v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987); United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 409 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
93. United States v. Moede, 48 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Sims, 
895 F.2d 326, 329 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
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for financial institutions because of the organizational culture and the 
complexity of the transactions underlying the 2008 financial crisis.94 
Under § 1833a, the DOJ has had considerable success charging 
financial institutions under the mail fraud and  wire  fraud statutes.95 
Mail fraud involves using the U.S. Postal Service or any private service, 
such as FedEx or UPS, in an effort to obtain money or property in 
furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.96 Likewise, wire fraud involves 
using telecommunication systems, including the Internet and email, to 
obtain money or property in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.97 The 
DOJ has relied principally on these two statutes because they are 
interpreted “to criminalize a wide range of conduct involving conflicts 
of interests, alleged misrepresentations, [and] the failure of agents to 
inform alleged principals of certain facts.”98 Moreover, the DOJ can 
amass thousands of mail and wire fraud violations because each  
separate use of the mail or wire connected to the fraudulent scheme 
constitutes a separate offense.99 For instance, Countrywide was ordered 
to pay nearly $1.3 billion for selling upwards of 7,600 defective loans— 
each loan constituting a separate offense—transmitted via  interstate 
mail and wire carriers.100 
 
 
 
 
94. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive- 
prosecutions/ (suggesting why criminal prosecutions arising out of the 2008 financial crisis 
have been absent). 
95. See Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal ¶ 10, United States v. Citigroup, 
Inc., No. 11 Civ. 5473 (VM) (Feb. 13, 2012); Settlement Agreement ¶ 11, United States v. 
JPMorgan. 
96. See United States v. Fox, 69 F.3d 15, 18–19 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence 
demonstrating that an item had been mailed is sufficient to support the conviction for mail 
fraud). 
97. See United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 437 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that 
defendant’s use of an internet connected program to process mortgage loan transactions 
constituted wire fraud). 
98. Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: 
Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 954 (1993). 
99. See C.J. Williams, What is the Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 287, 
287–88 (2014) (explaining how broadly the mail and wire fraud statutes may be construed). 
100. Ben Protess & Michael Corkery, Bank of America Offers U.S. Biggest Settlement in 
History, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 6, 2014, 4:27 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/bank-of-america-nears-17-billion-settlement-over- 
mortgages/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
  
 
 
276 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE          [Vol. 19 
C. Statute of Limitations 
 
Not only are the underlying criminal offenses broad, § 1833a 
also extends the statute of limitations.101 The civil actions cannot 
commence more than ten years after the cause of action accrues,102 
which is substantially longer than the typical three to five-year period 
for civil fraud suits.103 For both mail and wire  fraud, the criminal  
statute of limitations is five years.104 Under the criminal statute of 
limitations for mail and wire fraud, most of the actions contributing to 
the 2008 financial crisis would have been precluded.105   However, under 
§ 1833a, the extended period allows the DOJ to take its time and amass 
as much evidence as possible before deciding whether to bring charges 
against an individual or an institution.106 
In October 2012, the DOJ alleged that Wells Fargo submitted 
thousands of false loans to the Federal Housing Administration  
(“FHA”) from 2001 through 2005 in violation of both mail and wire 
fraud statutes.107    Typically, the seven-year lapse would bar the DOJ’s 
 
 
101. See Adam S. Lurie et al., United States: FIRREA: Expect Substantial Anti-Fraud 
Enforcement and Compliance Issues, MONDAQ (July 30, 2012), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/189330/FIRREA+Expect+Substantial+AntiFraud+E 
nforcement+And+Compliance+Issues (describing the benefits that FIRREA gives to 
prosecutors). 
102. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12 
U.S.C. § 1833a(h) (2012). 
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no 
person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the 
indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense 
shall have been committed.”); § 3293(2) (“No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished 
for a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate . . . section 1341 or 1343, if the offense affects a 
financial institution . . . unless the indictment is returned or the information is filed within 
10 years after the commission of the offense.”); see also JENNIFER R. ECKLUND, THE 
EVOLVING DEFINITION OF MORTGAGE FRAUD: ANALYZING THE CHANGES IN INTERPRETATION 
THROUGH COURT DECISIONS AND LEGISLATION SINCE THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS 2 
(2014). 
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). 
105. See ECKLUND, supra note 103. But see Will Congress Step in as a Threatening FIRREA 
Storm Approaches?, THE STREET (Jan. 13, 2015, 8:33 AM), 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/13008883/1/will-congress-step-in-as-a-threatening-firrea- 
storm-approaches.html (stating that since FIRREA carries a ten-year statute of limitations, 
“some actions could be brought through 2017”). 
106. See Jay Williams et al., FIRREA: An Old Acronym is Turning into the Government’s 
New Hammer on Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 129 BANKING L.J. 579, 581–82 
(2012) (discussing the benefits the Government has in pursuing civil claims under 
FIRREA). 
107. Wells Fargo Compl., supra note 86, ¶ 47. 
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action under similar mail and wire fraud statutes.108 Under FIRREA, 
however, the statute of limitations is extended an additional five years 
(totaling ten years), which permits the DOJ to collect all available 
information to support the action before filing the FIRREA claim.109 
 
D. Administrative Subpoenas 
 
The extended statute of limitations, coupled with the Attorney 
General’s subpoena power, allows the DOJ to conduct extensive 
discovery without ever filing suit.110 The Attorney General holds broad 
power to issue administrative subpoenas “to summon witnesses and 
require production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda,  
or other records which the Attorney General deems relevant or material 
to the inquiry.”111 While administrative subpoenas are not traditionally 
used in criminal investigations, they allow the prosecutor to compel 
testimony and production of documents in aid of the DOJ’s  
performance of its duties.112 With this authority, the DOJ may issue an 
administrative subpoena to any person believed to be in possession of 
evidence.113 In contrast, judicial subpoenas require court  approval 
before records must be produced.114 Moreover, judicial subpoenas also 
require a reason to believe that the evidence relates to a legitimate law 
enforcement investigation.115 Thus, the use of administrative subpoenas 
under FIRREA permits the DOJ to access vast amounts of information 
in pretrial discovery without having to acquire court approval.116 
 
 
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2012). But see § 3293 (extending statute of limitations except 
for mail and wire fraud schemes that affect a financial institution). 
109. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 
12 U.S.C. § 1833a(h), (g) (2012). 
110. Lurie, supra note 101. 
111. § 1833a(g)(1)(C) (emphasis added). 
112. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32880, ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS IN 
CRIMINAL AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS 1–4 (2006). 
113. Gregory A. Brower & Brett W. Johnson, What Corporate Counsel Should Know About 
Inspector General Investigations, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., June 18, 2010, at 1, 1–4. 
114. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 9-408, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00408.htm. 
115. 12 U.S.C. §3407(1) (2012). 
116. See Williams, supra note 106, (describing the benefits the Government has in pursuing 
civil claims under FIRREA); Andrew W. Schilling, U.S. Using Subpoenas Under 1989 Act 
as New Tool to Probe Financial Firms, REUTERS: FIN. REG. F. (Jan. 3, 2013, 4:28 PM), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2013/01/03/u-s-using-subpoenas-under- 
1989-act-as-new-tool-to-probe-financial-firms/. 
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Additionally, administrative subpoenas are rarely overturned.117 
For example, the DOJ issued an administrative subpoena to Clayton 
Holdings, LLC, for information relating to the “2008 collapse of the 
housing market and economy in the United  States.”118  Clayton 
Holdings provided major due diligence information to Wall Street firms 
that pooled mortgages into bonds, which were sold to investors.119  
When Clayton Holdings challenged the relevancy of the administrative 
subpoena, the U.S. District Court of Connecticut required that Clayton 
Holdings turn over its emails, databases, and due diligence reports 
concerning mortgage loans and mortgage pools from 2005 to 2007.120 
The court noted that FIRREA’s administrative subpoenas aid in 
determining whether any evidence exists.121 Therefore, the DOJ may 
utilize administrative subpoenas to investigate with mere suspicion.122 
 
E. Large Monetary Penalties 
 
Finally, the statute permits large monetary penalties against 
violators.123 Although the civil penalties may generally not exceed $1 
million,124 § 1833a has two exceptions that may increase the 
penalties.125   First, in the case of a continuing violation, the civil penalty 
 
 
117. See Andrew W. Schilling et al., Challenging FIRREA Subpoenas: The RMBS Working 
Group Faces Subpoena Fight, 101 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 905, 906 (Dec. 3, 2013) 
(stating that challenging a government subpoena does not justify the risk with the reward, 
because the challenges are rarely successful and only anger the prosecutor). 
118. Petition for Summary Enforcement of Administrative Subpoena ¶ 7, United States v. 
Clayton Holdings, LLC, No.3:13-mc-00116-RNC (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2013). 
119. See Tom Shoenberg, Clayton Should Give Mortgage Data to U.S., Says Judge, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11- 
11/clayton-should-give-mortgage-data-to-u-s-judge-says.html (describing the information 
that the DOJ was seeking to recover). 
120. See Recommended Ruling at 3–8, United States v. Clayton Holdings, LLC, No. 
3:13mc116 (RNC) (D. Conn. Nov. 11, 2013). 
121. See id. at 5–6. 
122. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) (describing the 
function of the administrative subpoena as “analogous to [that of] the Grand Jury, which 
does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate 
merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance 
that it is not”). 
123. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 
12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(1)–(3). 
124. § 1833a(b)(1). 
125. DOUGLAS W. BARUCH, FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP, FRAUD MAIL 
ALERT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT BRANDISHES RARELY USED WEAPON—FIRREA—IN FULL- 
SCALE ASSAULT ON S&P, AND CALIFORNIA JOINS THE BATTLE WITH SEPARATE STATE FALSE 
  
 
 
2015] FIRREA & THE SELF-AFFECTING THEORY 279 
may be increased to $5 million.126 Second, “if any person derives 
pecuniary gain from the violation, or if the violation results in pecuniary 
loss to a person other than the violator,” the civil penalty can be 
increased to the amount of such gain or loss.127 
Under both of these exceptions, the DOJ has sought increased 
penalties in bank prosecutions for alleged mortgage fraud.128 In 
settlement agreements resulting from § 1833a actions, defendants made 
substantial payments.129 As of February 2015, Bank of America has 
received the highest FIRREA civil penalty of  $5  billion.130 
Furthermore, since most of the DOJ’s FIRREA cases have ended in 
settlements, it is hard to determine if the penalties were based on 
detailed calculations or a negotiated  settlement.131  Nonetheless,  the 
DOJ reached these record-setting penalties because of the amount of 
available information in pretrial discovery that may be applied to broad 
criminal offenses under a lower burden of proof.132 
In Countrywide,133 the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York gave a detailed calculation as to how it 
reached the $1.2 billion FIRREA penalty.134 The court based  the  
penalty on Countrywide’s fraudulent scheme that induced Fannie Mae 
 
 
CLAIMS ACT COMPLAINT (Feb. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/Final%20- 
%202.11.2013%20%20FraudMail%20%20Justice%20Department%20Brandishes%20Rarel 
y%20Used%20Weapon.pdf (describing how the penalties are statutorily applied). 
126. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(2) (“In the case of a continuing violation, the amount of the 
civil penalty may exceed the amount described in paragraph (1) but may not exceed the 
lesser of $1,000,000 per day or $5,000,000.”). 
127. § 1833a(b)(3). 
128. See ALLYSON B. BAKER & ANDREW OLMEM, VENABLE, LLP, FIRREA: THE DOJ’S 
EXPANSIVE (AND EXPENSIVE) TOOL OF CHOICE 1 (Oct. 9, 2013). 
129. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 2, United States v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 5473 
(VM) (July 15, 2014) (applying a $4 billion FIRREA penalty); Settlement Agreement at 3, 
United States v. JPMorgan, No. 13 Civ. 0220 (JPO) (Nov. 19, 2013) (applying a $2 billion 
FIRREA penalty). 
130. See Settlement Agreement at 5, United States v. Bank of America Corp, No. 13 Civ. 
446 (MOC) (M.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 2014) (applying a $5 billion FIRREA penalty). 
131. Michael Ide, Bank of America And DOJ: What Can We Learn From JPMorgan’s 
Experience, VALUEWALK (Apr. 28, 2014, 9:21 AM), 
http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/04/bank-of-america-doj-jpmorgan/ (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
132. Villalpando, supra note 58. 
133. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(Countrywide I). 
134. Opinion and Order at 10–15, 19, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12-CV- 
1422 (JSR), 2014 WL 3734122 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014) (Countrywide III). 
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and Freddie Mac to purchase risky mortgages originating from the 
“High Speed Swim Lane” (“HSSL”) program.135 In calculating the 
damages, the court determined that the HSSL program started on 
August 13, 2007, and ended on May 22, 2008.136 During that roughly 
nine-month period, a total of 28,882 loans, valued at $4.8 billion, were 
sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.137 Of the 28,882 loans, the HSSL 
program initiated 17,611 defective loans, comprising 61% of the total 
loans sold.138 The court valued each loan at the price Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac paid to Countrywide for the defective loan and determined 
that the upper-limit of the penalty equaled 61% of the total amount paid, 
which equaled $2.9 billion.139  Of the 17,611 defective HSSL loans,   
57% percent proved not to be materially defective, and the total 
damages were reduced by 43% to $1.2 billion.140 
IV. THE DOJ AND THE CASE LAW BOLSTERING THE SELF-AFFECTING 
THEORY 
 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the DOJ has actively 
pursued charges against financial institutions for the pervasive mortgage 
and financial fraud that occured prior to the crisis.141 In response, 
President Barack Obama created the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task 
Force (“Fraud Task Force”) with the primary purpose to hold 
accountable and assign liability to those responsible for the 2008 
financial   crisis.142          After   failed   criminal   prosecutions,   the  U.S. 
 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 7–8. 
137. Id. at 14 n.10. 
138. Id. at 9. 
139. Id. at 14 n.10. 
140. Id. at 15. 
141. ECKLUND, supra note 103, at 9. 
142. Executive Order 13519, Establishment of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task 
Force, Nov. 17, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive- 
order-financial-fraud-enforcement-task-force (stating the intent of the FFETF is “to 
investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes and other violations relating to the 
current financial crisis and economic recovery efforts, recover the proceeds of such crimes 
and violations, and ensure just and effective punishment of those who perpetrate financial 
crimes and violations . . . ”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bank of America 
to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading 
up to and During the Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank- 
america-pay-1665-billion-historic-justice-department-settlement-financial-fraud-leading 
(stating that post-settlement with Bank of America, the Fraud Task Force has recovered 
$36.65 billion to date for American consumers and investors). 
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Attorneys Office rediscovered FIRREA and began to use § 1833a.143 
Section 1833a is a “hybrid statute predicating civil liability on  the 
[DOJ] proving criminal violations . . . by a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.”144 Under § 1833a, the DOJ has advanced the Self- 
Affecting Theory in a wide array of contexts, such as FHA loan 
origination and servicing,145 loan sales to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac,146  and foreign exchange practices.147 
The Self-Affecting Theory allows the DOJ to sue a financial 
institution when it has committed one or more of the five enumerated 
offenses that “affect[] a federally insured financial institution.”148 The 
five predicate offenses are: (1) false claims made to the officers or 
agencies of the United States;149 (2) false statements or entries made to 
the U.S. government;150 (3) attempts to conceal assets or property from 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;151 (4) use of interstate mail 
carriers in a scheme to defraud;152 and (5) use of electronic, radio, or 
television communications in a scheme to defraud.153 The DOJ has 
largely utilized the mail fraud and wire fraud offenses to trigger the 
Self-Affecting Theory.154 
Section  1883a,  however,  does  not  define  what  constitutes 
 
 
 
 
143. Schilling, supra note 61, at 186. 
144. Opinion and Order at 5, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12-CV-1422 
(JSR), 2014 WL 3734122 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014) (Countrywide III). 
145. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 593, 629–33 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
146. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605–06 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
147. United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (holding that “BNYM has been charged with participating in a fraudulent scheme and 
harming itself in the process. . . . [BNYM’s] motion to dismiss on this ground is denied in 
full.”). 
148. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12 
U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2) (2012); Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (“[S]ince 
Bank of America is itself a federally insured financial institution, its wrongful conduct (and 
the conduct of Countrywide imputed to it) ‘affected’ a federally insured financial institution. 
(The parties refer to this as the ‘self-affecting’ theory).”). 
149. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012). 
150. § 1001(a)(1)–(3). 
151. § 1032(1). 
152. § 1341. 
153. § 1343. 
154. See Wells Fargo Compl., supra note 88, ¶¶ 167–73; Countrywide Compl., supra note 
74, ¶¶ 182–86; BNYM Compl., supra note 88, ¶¶ 182–185. 
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“affecting a federally insured financial institution.”155 Yet courts have 
interpreted this language in § 1833a by applying the dictionary 
definition of “affect,” meaning “ ‘to act upon’ as in ‘to produce  an 
effect . . . upon,’ ‘to produce a material influence upon or alteration in,’ 
or possible ‘to have a detrimental influence on.’ ”156 Some courts assert 
that a financial institution is “affected” by its own conduct whenever its 
participation harms itself irrespective of whether it participated in its 
own fraudulent scheme.157 Accordingly, in holding that the Self- 
Affecting Theory allows the financial institution to be both the victim 
and perpetrator,158 courts have relied on the canons of statutory 
interpretation and case law interpreting a similar provision, 18 U.S.C. § 
3293(2),159  under FIRREA.160 
 
A. Courts and DOJ Constructions of § 1833a 
 
In United States v. Bank of New York Mellon,161 the DOJ  
brought a FIRREA civil fraud action alleging that from 2000 to 2011 
BNYM defrauded its custodial clients who used BNYM’s standing 
instruction foreign exchange service.162 Under the standing instruction 
service, BNYM would complete foreign exchange transactions on an as 
needed basis, and BNYM would determine the price of the currency the 
custodial client received.163 The DOJ alleged that BNYM, using 
interstate mail and wire carriers, selected the worst possible exchange 
rates for its clients and that BNYM profited from these trades because it 
 
155. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12 
U.S.C. § 1833(a)(c)(2) (2012). 
156. United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 35 (1993)); see also United 
States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F.Suppp.2d 598, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Countrywide 
I) (holding that in this context “affect” has the same meaning as the dictionary definition). 
157. See Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
158. See id. at 451 (holding that defendants’ argument that affecting is synonymous with 
victimizing and that the harm needs to come from a third person is not persuasive). 
159. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 961(l), 103 Stat. 183, 501 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
3293(2) (2012)). 
160. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 593, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (rejecting Wells Fargo’s defense to the Self-Affecting Theory on the grounds that the 
text support a reading of the Self-Affecting Theory and that § 3293(2) contains nearly the 
same language). 
161. 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
162. BNYM Compl., supra note 88, ¶ 1. 
163. Id. ¶¶ 26–38. 
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received the difference between the actual rate and the rate it charged its 
clients.164 The DOJ proffered the Self-Affecting Theory by arguing that 
BNYM, as a federally insured financial institution, had affected itself 
because the fraudulent scheme had exposed it to significant risk of legal 
exposure.165 In response, BNYM argued that § 1833a imposes penalties 
“if any person derives pecuniary gain from the violation,”166 which, 
under a natural reading, would distinguish the person potentially subject 
to the penalties from the federally insured financial institution that was 
the target of the violation.167 
BNYM’s argument against the Self-Affecting Theory was not 
persuasive to Judge Lewis A. Kaplan.168 The initial  provision  of § 
1833a provides that “[w]hoever violates any provision of law to which 
this section is made applicable by subsection (c) of this section shall be 
subject to a civil penalty in an amount assessed by the court in a civil 
action under this section.”169 The term “whoever” applies to 
“corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, 
and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”170 Courts  have 
further determined that “whoever” should be “ ‘construed liberally.’ ”171 
When read in conjunction with “affecting a federally insured financial 
institution,”172 the term “whoever” would permit any federally insured 
financial institution that has committed one of the five predicate  
offenses to be liable for harming itself.173 
Judge Kaplan also found the Self-Affecting Theory to constitute 
a   valid   reading  within  the   statutory  structure   of  § 1833a(c)(2).174 
 
 
164. Id. ¶¶ 175–77. 
165. Id. 
166. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12 
U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). 
167. § 1833a(c)(2); BNYM Mem., supra note 1, at 11. 
168. See United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
169. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(a); see also Memorandum of Law of the United States in 
Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss at 14, supra note 2 (“If Congress had 
intended to exempt federally insured financial institutions from civil penalties under 
FIRREA when they engage in fraudulent conduct ‘affecting’ themselves, it could have 
easily done so.  Instead, it used the broad language ‘[w]hoever.’ ” ). 
170. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
171. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 461 (quoting United States v. A&P 
Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 123 n.2 (1958)). 
172. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2). 
173. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 452. 
174. Id. at 463. 
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Neither § 1833a(c)(1)175 nor (3)176 contains the “affecting a federally 
insured financial institution” language found in § 1833a(c)(2),177 which 
necessitates that the violation or conspiracy violate a predicate offense 
“affecting a federally insured financial institution.”178 In resolving the 
discrepancy, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York concluded that the limiting language was not added to require the 
offense be directed at the financial institution; rather, “affecting” is 
synonymous with “involving”179 and, therefore, “being in the financial 
industry.”180 Thus, according to the court, § 1833a(c)(2) should be read 
to encompass all conduct involving the entire financial industry, 
including how a financial institution’s conduct may affect itself.181 
 
B. Courts and DOJ Interpretation of § 3293(2) 
 
In United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,182 the DOJ brought  
a FIRREA civil fraud action alleging that Wells Fargo’s residential 
mortgage lending business defrauded the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (“HUD”) from May 2001 through October 2005, 
which resulted in the FHA paying $190 million on defaulted 
mortgages.183      When  a  borrower  defaults  on  a  residential  mortgage 
 
175. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(1) (listing the following predicate offenses under Title 18 of 
the United States Code: 215, 656, 657, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014 or 1344). 
176. § 1833a(c)(3) (listing a violation of conspiracy to violate 15 U.S.C. § 645(a) as a 
predicate offense). 
177. § 1833a(c) (“This section applies to a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate section 
287, 1001, 1032, 1341 or 1343 of Title 18 affecting a federally insured financial 
institution . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (describing the use of 
“the Postal Service, or . . . private or commercial interstate carrier” for the purpose of 
executing, or attempting to execute, “[a] scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining 
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (describing the use of “wire . . . in interstate or foreign 
commerce” for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, “[a] scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises . . .”). 
178. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2). 
179. The Southern District of New York found this comparison between affecting and 
involving relevant because of the heading for Subtitle E of Title IX of FIRREA, which is the 
section containing § 1833a.  Subtitle E was entitled, “Civil Penalties for Violations 
Involving Financial Institutions.” United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 
2d 438, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
180. Id. at 454. 
181. Id. at 453. 
182. 972 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
183. See Wells Fargo Compl., supra note 88, ¶ 136. 
  
 
 
2015]          FIRREA & THE SELF-AFFECTING THEORY 285 
insured by the FHA, HUD pays the lender the balance of the loan and 
HUD assumes ownership of the foreclosed property.184 Since the FHA 
and HUD are federal agencies and not federally insured financial 
institutions, the DOJ alleged that Wells Fargo’s fraudulent conduct, as a 
federally insured financial institution, “has affected the bank by 
exposing it to actual losses and increased risk of loss[,]”185 which 
included exposure to civil liabilities under the False Claims Act alleged 
in the same complaint.186 
In denying Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss, Judge Jesse  
Furman relied on other courts interpreting § 3293(2),187 which is a 
similar provision in FIRREA that contains nearly identical language as 
§ 1833a.188 Section 3293(2) extends the statute of limitations for mail 
fraud189 and wire fraud190 from five years to ten years “if the offense 
affects a financial institution.”191 Courts previously interpreting § 
3293(2) held that to trigger the “affecting” language, the DOJ only  
needs to allege facts that would demonstrate an institution’s exposure to 
an increased risk of loss due to its conduct.192 Applying that same 
reasoning, the U.S. District Court for Southern District of New York 
found that the DOJ had sufficiently alleged two increased risks of loss 
that had resulted because of Wells Fargo’s allegedly fraudulent 
scheme.193 First, Wells Fargo’s fraudulent underwriting practices 
resulted in FHA-insured loans that would likely default, and 
consequently, the FHA had to indemnify HUD against those defaulted 
loans.194 Second, Wells Fargo’s fraudulent practices have exposed it to 
“significant legal expenditures.”195 
Similarly, in  Countrywide,196  the DOJ initiated a FIRREA civil 
 
184. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 593, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
185. See Wells Fargo Compl., supra note 88, ¶ 170. 
186. Id. at 47. 
187. 18 U.S.C. § 3292(2) (2012). 
188. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d at 630. 
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
190. § 1343. 
191. § 3292(2). 
192. United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 694–95 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273, 1278–79 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bank of New York 
Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 457–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
193. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d at 630. 
194. Id. at 630–31. 
195. Id. at 631. 
196. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(Countrywide I). 
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fraud suit arising from an alleged scheme to defraud Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.197 Under § 1833a, the DOJ sought to recover civil  
penalties for violations of mail fraud198 and wire fraud199 that “affect[ed] 
federally insured financial institutions.”200 The DOJ alleged that in  
2007, Countrywide’s residential mortgage lending business instituted a 
loan origination model, known as HSSL,201 which increased the rate at 
which it originated and sold loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  
while eliminating underwriting and compliance supervision.202  The 
DOJ, using the Self-Affecting Theory, alleged that the affected federally 
insured financial institutions were Countrywide and Bank of America, 
because both entities have “directly or indirectly paid billions to settle 
repurchase demands.”203 After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor  
of the DOJ on October 23, 2013,204 and Judge Jed Rakoff ordered 
Countrywide to pay $1.2 billion in FIRREA penalties.205 
Judge Rakoff upheld the Self-Affecting Theory based on 
Countrywide having to settle repurchase claims to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac resulting from the fraudulent HSSL scheme.206 Moreover, 
Judge Rakoff stated that since Countrywide committed mail and wire 
fraud, the court was able to rule that “such ‘self-inflicting’ effects were 
not only sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that a federally 
insured entity be affected, but also were here sufficient to warrant being 
found by the [c]ourt as a matter of law.”207 Further, Judge Rakoff 
reasoned that the threat of criminal liability alone is enough to affect the 
federally insured financial institution, which is enough to satisfy 
FIRREA.208    Citing Judge Furman’s interpretation of § 3293(2) in Wells 
 
 
197. Countrywide Compl., supra note 74, at 2. 
198. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
199. § 1343. 
200. Countrywide Compl., supra note 74, at 10. 
201. Id. at 3. 
202. Id. at 3–5. 
203. Id. at 39–40. 
204. See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 8 (discussing progression of the Self-Affecting 
Theory through case law). 
205. See Opinion and Order at 15, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 12-CV- 
1422 (JSR), 2014 WL 3734122 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014) (Countrywide III). 
206. United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(Countrywide I). 
207. See United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 996 F. Supp. 2d 247, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (Countrywide II). 
208. Id. at 249–50. 
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Fargo Bank,209 Judge Rakoff agreed that the DOJ “need not allege  
actual harm, but only facts that would demonstrate that the bank 
suffered an increase risk of loss due to its own conduct.”210 
V. THE SELF-AFFECTING THEORY IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
 
The Self-Affecting Theory is inconsistent with FIRREA’S 
legislative purpose because Congress intended to give the DOJ a tool  
for protecting financial institutions from individuals seeking personal 
gain at their institution’s expense.211 Prosecutions arising out of the  
S&L Crisis were conducted with that purpose in mind.212 However, in 
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis the DOJ has used § 1833a to 
assign liability to an unintended class of perpetrators, going beyond the 
congressional intent.213 The DOJ has erroneously applied the Self- 
Affecting Theory to recover damages and force settlements from the 
nation’s largest financial institutions for two reasons.214 First, courts 
have applied the case law of § 3293(2) without fully examining its 
limitations.215 Second, the DOJ has circumvented FIRREA’s legislative 
intent by shifting its policy from protecting banks from fraudulent third 
parties to prosecuting banks for internal fraudulent activities.216 
 
A. The DOJ’s Application of § 3293(2) to Its Interpretation of § 
1833a 
 
The DOJ has utilized holdings from cases interpreting § 3293(2) 
 
 
 
209. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
210. Countrywide Fin. Corp. 996 F. Supp. 2d at 250 (Countrywide II). 
211. William F. Johnson, Mortgage Lending Enforcement Invokes Old Tool With New 
Theories, 249 N.Y. L.J., Jan. 3, 2013, at 1, 2 (discussing FIRREA’s intended purpose and 
how it has been used for something entirely different). 
212. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 76 (listing examples and statistics of 
prosecutions arising out of the S&L Crisis). 
213. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 15–17, United States v. 
Countrywide, 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
214. See Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 71, at 1–2. 
215. See Final Form Superseding Consolidated Brief for Defendant-Appellant Gary Heinz at 
30, United States v. Heinz, No. 13-3119, 2014 WL 7232369 (Dec. 17, 2014) (arguing on 
appeal that 18 U.S.C. § 3293(2) (2012) should not apply where the financial institution has 
settled previous cases). 
216. See Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 71, at 2. 
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without addressing § 3293(2)’s intended purpose.217  That section and  
its limiting language were not meant to harm financial institutions.218 
Rather, the purpose of § 3293(2) served “to protect financial  
institutions, a goal it tries to accomplish in large part by deterring 
would-be criminals from including financial institutions in their 
schemes.”219 FIRREA sought to protect the depositors and federal 
taxpayers from the fraudulent behavior that caused the S&L Crisis.220 
Therefore, the DOJ has bolstered the Self-Affecting Theory by taking a 
seemingly analogous provision out of its contextual boundaries and 
applying it contrary to congressional intent.221 
In addition, the DOJ does not address other case law that 
developed limitations on when a financial institution has been affected 
within § 3293(2).222 The Fourth Circuit has held that “mere utilization” 
of a financial institution in a fraudulent scheme is not by itself sufficient 
to trigger the “affecting” language.223 There needs to be evidence of 
some impact on the financial institution.224    The alleged fraud  needs  to 
 
 
217. Memorandum of Law of the United States in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 30–32, United States v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (listing all of the rules derived from courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3293(2) without 
ever stating the legislative intent). 
218. See Alyssa King, The Protection of Deposits and Depositors: A Limited Interpretation 
of 12 U.S.C. § 1833a, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 759, 782–83 (2014) (describing prior case law 
that limits § 1833a(c)(2)). 
219. United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 2003). 
220. See United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (“In fact, the legislative history shows who Congress truly believe were the victims of 
the S&L Crisis and whom Congress sought to protect through FIRREA: S & L depositors 
and federal taxpayers put at risk by the thrifts’ fraudulent behavior.”); see also 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 6, United States v. Countrywide Fin. 
Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
221. See Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss the 
First Amended Complaint at 18, United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 
593 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
222. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9–11, United States v. Countrywide 
Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Countrywide I). 
223. United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The district court 
correctly concluded during Ubakanma’s sentencing hearing that a wire fraud offense under 
section 1343 ‘affected’ a financial institution only if the institution itself were victimized by 
the fraud, as opposed to the scheme’s mere utilization of the financial institution in the 
transfer of funds.”). 
224. United States v. Agnes, 214 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Pelullo, 
964 F.2d 193, 216 (3rd Cir. 1992)) (“The court in Pelullo recognized that . . . the effect on 
the bank would be too attenuated to invoke the statute in certain circumstances, for example, 
‘if the fraud was directed against a customer of the depository institution which was then 
prejudiced in its dealings with the institution.’ ”). 
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evidence a “sufficiently direct” result on the financial institution to 
trigger the extended statute of limitations.225 Moreover, the alleged  
fraud must proximately cause the harm or risk of harm, which 
necessarily includes reasonable foreseeability.226 A well-recognized 
canon of statutory construction provides that punitive statutes must be 
narrowly construed.227 Therefore, allowing settlements and related legal 
costs would be too attenuated to demonstrate an effect.228  Thus, it  
would be too remote to hold a financial institution liable for harm it 
might suffer by enacting the allegedly fraudulent schemes.229 
Similarly, allowing the DOJ to proceed after only demonstrating 
a new or increased risk of loss in pursuing FIRREA penalties is 
contradictive to the congressional intent of § 1833a.230   Congress passed 
§ 1833a in direct response to the insider abuse and fraud that catalyzed 
the S&L Crisis.231 Congress did not contemplate that FIRREA  would  
be used to prosecute a financial institution for conduct affecting itself.232 
 
225. See United States v. Rubin/Chambers, Dunhill Ins. Servs., 831 F. Supp. 2d 779, 783 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing United States v. Bouyea, 152 F.3d 192, 195 (2nd Cir. 1998)); see 
also Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 459 (“[T]he Court is mindful that effects 
must be ‘sufficiently direct’ and that ‘there maybe some point where the influence a 
defendant’s wire fraud has on a financial institution becomes so attenuated, so remote, so 
indirect . . . that it does not in any meaningful sense affect the institution.’ ” (internal 
citations omitted)); Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9, United States v. 
Countrywide, 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
226. See Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 460. 
227. See United States v. Vanoosterhout, 898 F. Supp. 25, 30 (D.D.C. 1995). 
228. See King, supra note 218, at 786. 
229. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9, United States v. Countrywide 
Fin. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing the DOJ’s alternative theory of 
liability, the “derivative affects” theory, which would consider financial institutions to be 
affected under the mail and wire fraud statutes solely by their investment in another entity 
that was the direct object of the alleged fraud); Final Form Superseding Consolidated Brief 
for Defendant-Appellant Peter Ghavami at 29, United States v. Heinz, No. 13-3119, 2014 
WL 7232371 (Dec. 17, 2014) (arguing that the plain language, legislative history, and 
purpose of § 3293(2) demonstrate that “settlement agreements reached by a culpable bank 
are not the type of harm contemplated by the statute”). 
230. See Bank of New York Mellon’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to 
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 10–11, United States v. Bank of New York 
Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
231. See 1989 GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 10 (“Serious misconduct by senior insiders or 
outsiders (i) has caused, has contributed to, or was present in the insolvencies of most banks, 
savings and loan (S&Ls), and credit unions, and (ii) also caused large losses in unhealthy 
and healthy institutions during the period 1984 through the first half of 1987.” (citations 
omitted)). 
232. See Christopher Matthews, Federal Prosecutors Emerge From Mortgage-Fraud Trial 
With New Weapon, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2013, 6:39 PM) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304069604579154033805282804 
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Likewise, case law interpreting similar “affecting” language has not 
held that a financial institution “can be penalized on the basis that its 
fraud against a third party affected a financial institution by virtue of its 
own investment in that third party.”233 In effect, the DOJ has taken § 
1833a beyond its intended boundaries of prosecuting individuals by 
applying it to prosecuting financial institutions.234 
 
B. The DOJ’s Prosecutions Under § 1833a 
 
The prosecutions stemming from the S&L Crisis bolster the 
view that FIRREA was enacted to deter individuals from damaging 
financial institutions and their depositors.235 Between 1988 and 1992,  
the DOJ charged and convicted over 2,500 individual defendants.236 A 
majority of the convictions rested on the individual violating or 
conspiring to violate the predicate offenses listed under § 1833a(c).237 
While the prosecution statistics fail to show any cases involving a 
financial institution affecting itself, the statistics readily demonstrate 
DOJ actions against individuals.238 For example, special government 
task forces sentenced nearly 800 bank officials to prison terms with a 
conviction rate of nearly 96%.239 Therefore, prosecuting a financial 
institution   under   § 1833a   appears   contradictory   to   how   the DOJ 
 
 
(quoting Steve Bartlett, a former Republican congressman from Texas, who co-sponsored 
FIRREA, as saying that the Justice Department’s new use of FIRREA strays from the law’s 
intent and that “he never recalled discussing the possibility that the law could be used this 
way as it was drafted and ultimately passed through Congress”). 
233. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9, United States v. Countrywide Fin. 
Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Countrywide I). 
234. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 104–05 (stating that the Special Counsel 
appointed by President George H. W. Bush sought to “emphasize the need to proceed with 
the coordinated two-pronged effort to put the crooks in jail and take their money back for 
the public”). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 76 (“Between October 1, 1988, and June 30, 1992, Justice charged 3,270 
defendants through indictments and information[] and convicted 2,603 defendants (110 
defendants were acquitted, establishing a conviction rate near 96 percent).”). 
237. Compare id. at 14 (noting the commonly applied banking statutes in FIRREA 
prosecutions) with Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c) (2012) (listing the predicate offenses for civil liability). 
238. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 69–84 (discussing the prosecution statistics 
for financial institution fraud offenders). 
239. See id. at 77–80 (listing examples of successful prosecutions against individuals and 
their accompanying criminal and civil penalties); see also Morgenson & Story, supra note 
52. 
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originally employed FIRREA regarding the S&L Crisis.240 
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the Fraud Task Force  
has pursued primarily civil enforcement and regulatory action as 
opposed to criminal convictions.241 In its “First Year Report” published 
in 2011, the Fraud Task Force vaguely listed its prosecution statistics 
under Operation Stolen Dreams, but it did not specifically state the 
violations leading to the prosecutions.242 Three years later, it has  
become apparent that the DOJ has increasingly resorted  to pursuing 
civil actions under FIRREA to sanction alleged corporate misconduct 
resulting from the 2008 financial crisis.243 The likely reasons for the 
shift from criminal to civil liability are twofold: first, the DOJ has 
geared its prosecution policy towards charging organizations;244 and 
second, the complexity of the financial instruments and transactions 
underlying the financial crisis make proving criminal culpability 
difficult.245 
The 2008 DOJ revisions—also referred to as the Filip 
Memorandum, to the United States Attorneys’ Manual, which is binding 
on all federal prosecutors—altered how federal prosecutors investigate 
and prosecute corporate crimes.246 Specifically, the Filip Memorandum 
added a provision allowing federal prosecutors to determine whether or 
not to pursue  non-criminal alternatives.247  In evaluating the  adequacy 
of the non-criminal alternatives (civil or regulatory enforcement 
actions),  the  federal  prosecutor  has  broad  discretion  and  may  even 
 
240. See Matthews, supra note 232 (stating that when FIRREA was used previously, it was 
employed against individuals whose frauds harmed the financial institution). 
241. See Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 71, at 2. 
242. See FIN. FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, FIRST YEAR REPORT, at 4.8–4.9 (2011) 
(separating and listing the number of criminal and civil enforcement actions under 
Operation Stolen Dreams while not detailing what offenses the violators committed). 
243. See Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 71. 
244. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS, §§ 9-28.100–.1300 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2008/08/28/corp-charging- 
guidelines.pdf. 
245. Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 71. 
246. ALAN I. RAYLESBER, CHADBOURNE & PARK LLP, CLIENT ALERT: DOJ REVISES 
GUIDELINES TO LIMIT DEMANDS THAT CORPORATIONS WAIVE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
OR NOT ADVANCE EMPLOYEE’S LEGAL FEES AS A CONDITION OF ‘COOPERATING’ WITH A 
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION (Sept. 8, 2008), 
http://www.chadbourne.com/clientalerts/2008/dojrevises/. 
247. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.1100 (Other Civil 
or Regulatory Alternatives) (Aug. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.1100. 
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consider “the likelihood that an effective sanction will be imposed.”248 
Considering this discretion in light of either the lack of enough evidence 
to surpass the criminal burden of proof249 or the belief that criminal 
prosecutions may have a negative effect on the economy,250 the DOJ has 
authority to pursue financial institutions in civil actions. 
In addition to the DOJ policy favoring civil action, the complex 
circumstances giving rise to the 2008 financial crisis and the 
institutional structure of the financial institutions make criminal 
prosecutions unappealing.251 Although evidence of insider abuse and 
fraud exists, the pervasiveness of such conduct cannot be singled out 
with enough certainty to meet the criminal standard.252 The 
organizational culture allows for responsibility to be dispersed among 
high-ranking employees, which portrays any misconduct as 
symptomatic of the entire organization.253  Prior to the recent crisis,  
most institutions incentivized its participants in fraudulent schemes by 
offering  larger   salary  bonuses  for   increased  loan  volume.254      This 
 
248. Id. § 9-28.1100(A)(2). 
249. See Frontline Interview with Lanny Breuer, Lanny Breuer: Financial Fraud Has Not 
Gone Unpunished, FRONTLINE (Jan. 22, 2013, 9:42 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial- 
crisis/untouchables/lanny-breuer-financial-fraud-has-not-gone-unpunished/ (“With respect 
to Wall Street cases, we looked at those as hard as we looked at any others, and when a case 
could be brought, we did. But when we cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there 
was criminal intent, then we have a constitutional duty not to bring those cases.”). 
250. See Dunstan Prial, Why Us and Not Them?, FOX BUSINESS (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy-policy/2014/05/23/why-us-and-not-them/ (quoting 
former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder as saying that he was concerned with “the size of 
some of these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute 
them when we are hit with indications that . . . if we do bring a criminal charge . . . it will 
have a negative impact on the national economy”). 
251. See Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 71. 
252. See Jason M. Breslow, Were Bankers Jailed in Past Financial Crises?, FRONTLINE 
(Jan. 22, 2013, 9:43 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy- 
financial-crisis/untouchables/were-bankers-jailed-in-past-financial-crises/ (stating that fraud 
and insider abuse caused a significant number of failed thrifts in the S&L Crisis, but that is 
not the case in the 2008 financial crisis). But see Gretchen Morgenson, Was There a Loan it 
Didn’t Like?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/business/02gret.html?pagewanted=all (quoting a 
senior mortgage writer at Washington Mutual as saying, “ ‘They started giving loan officers 
free trips if they closed so many loans, fly them to Hawaii for a month,’ [senior mortgage 
writer] recalls, ‘One of my account reps went to Jamaica for a month because he closed $3.5 
million in loans that month’ ”). 
253. See Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions (Sept. 17, 
2014) (transcript available at www.stopfraud.gov). 
254. Steve Denning, Lest We Forget: Why We Had A Financial Crisis, FORBES BLOG (Nov. 
22, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/. 
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created an adversarial system within the organization that condoned 
misconduct and deterred reporting such conduct.255 A study released in 
2013 noted that 26% of the survey respondents with ten years or less 
experience in the financial industry believed that they have to engage in 
misconduct to get ahead.256 Even though evidence of misconduct exists 
in these institutions,257 the pervasiveness of such conduct cannot be 
singled out with enough certainty to reach the criminal level.258 
Moreover, when dealing with large financial institutions, 
especially in the subprime mortgage lending arena, the ability  to 
pinpoint individual culpability becomes even more opaque.259 In the 
subprime mortgage market, depository institutions would initially use a 
mortgage broker, who acted as a middleman between the lender and 
borrower, to issue newly formed mortgages.260 The  depository 
institution would then sell the mortgage to investment banks that pooled 
together various mortgages, estimated future cash flows, and then 
converted the cash flows into bonds secured by the compiled 
mortgages.261 The investment bank would then sell the bonds to buyers, 
who purchased shares and became the owners of the mortgage-backed 
securities.262 The subprime mortgage market invoked participation of 
countless individuals, which makes demonstrating the requisite 
fraudulent  intent  for  criminal  liability difficult.263     Thus,  the DOJ, in 
 
 
255. See LABATON SUCHAROW, WALL STREET IN CRISIS: A PERFECT STORM LOOMING 1 
(2013), available at 
http://www.secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/LiteratureRetrieve.aspx?ID=182189&A=Search 
Result&SearchID=4865706&ObjectID=182189&ObjectType=6 (reporting that most Wall 
Street employees feel that they must engage in misconduct in order to get ahead). 
256. Id. at 3. 
257. Morgenson, supra note 252. 
258. Breslow, supra note 252. 
259. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 90–92 (Jan. 
2011) (discussing the various models employed and roles played by subprime mortgage 
lenders prior to the 2008 financial crisis); see also See Who Is Too Big To Fail: Are Large 
Financial Institutions Immune From Personal Prosecution? Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 113th Cong. 6–7 
(2013) (statement of Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General) [hereinafter 
Raman Hearing]. 
260. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage 
Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1090 (2014). 
261. Id. at 1090–91. 
262. Id. 
263. Don Mayer et al., Crime and Punishment (or the Lack Thereof) for Financial Fraud in 
the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Reasons and Remedies for Legal and Ethical Lapses, 51 
AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 542 (2014). 
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seeking to assign liability from the 2008 financial crisis, has opted to 
look at criminal conduct as a general, civil matter within a financial 
institution.264 
Although the DOJ may have authority to pursue civil actions 
against financial institutions, it does not necessarily make it desirable.265 
In determining the applicability of § 1833a, the statute’s “wording 
against the background of its legislative history and in the light of the 
general objectives Congress sought to achieve” must be considered.266  
In § 1833a, Congress illustrated a clear intent to deter fraudulent 
conduct by individuals.267 By applying the Self-Affecting Theory, 
however, the DOJ has disregarded the legislative intent and instead 
proffered a literal interpretation of § 1833a that is contrary to 
congressional intent.268 
 
264. Raman Hearing, supra note 259. 
265. See GEORGE COSTELLO & YULE KIM, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 3 (2008) (stating that the statute may derive meaning from 
the “definition of terms, by the statute’s statement of findings and purposes, by the 
directive’s relationship to other specific directives . . . and by the statute’s overall structure. 
Courts also look to the broader context of the body of law into which the enactment fits”). 
266. Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968). 
267. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 300 (1989). The report described the losses arising 
from the S&L Crisis had a general pattern: 
 
While the majority of thrifts are run by honest and dedicated 
management, it is clear that fraud and insider abuse has been a major 
factor in a significant portion of thrift failures in the 1980’s.  Many  
fraud cases involving FSLIC’s largest losses have borne an uncanny 
resemblance. The general pattern has been a state chartered institution 
that underwent a change of control during the early 1980’s. These 
institutions participated in rapid growth schemes and adopted risky 
investment strategies. Poor management techniques and 
unresponsiveness to regulatory appeals for change are also a hallmark of 
these institutions; so are high levels of compensation and extravagant 
expenditures. Regulators estimate that as many as 40% of thrift failures 
are due to some form of fraud or insider abuse. 
 
Id. 
268. See LEGISLATIVE INTENT SERVICE, INC., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT AS AIDES TO 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN FEDERAL COURT 3 (citing O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 
79 (1996); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987); FDIC v. 
Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476, U.S. 426, 432 (1986); Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 746 
n.15, 748 n.18 (1985); Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 222–32, 222 n.20 
(1981); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 
193, 201 (1979); Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 469 (1975); United House Found. v. 
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 
457 (1892) (“The literal interpretation of words of an act should not prevail if it creates a 
result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislator and if the words are sufficiently 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
FIRREA intended to assign liability to individuals who were 
responsible for causing the S&L Crisis.269 The 2008 financial crisis, 
however, presented a new set of circumstances that involved complex 
transactions within large financial institutions.270 When trying to assign 
individual criminal culpability, it is not surprising that the DOJ 
struggled with overcoming the criminal burden of proving “whether or 
not the entity or person acted willfully, that is, with an intent to violate 
the law.”271 The DOJ experienced this difficulty first hand when the  
jury returned the not guilty verdicts for the two Bear Stearns senior 
managers.272 In attempting to assign culpability, the DOJ has  
improvised new ways to assign liability.273 The DOJ has used the Self- 
Affecting Theory to hold three of the nation’s largest financial 
institutions civilly liable for criminal misconduct.274 
The Self-Affecting Theory, however, is not within the scope and 
legislative intent of Congress.275 Congress passed FIRREA with the 
intention that it would be used to help banks, not hurt  them.276  Thus,  
the DOJ has used FIRREA for a contrary purpose as it continues to 
assign liability to the very financial institutions it was ordered to 
protect.277 
Since the Self-Affecting Theory has yet to be overturned, the 
DOJ  will  likely  continue  to  pursue  FIRREA  claims  against  large 
 
flexible to allow construction which will effectuate the legislative intention.”). 
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271. Raman Hearing, supra note 259. 
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Approach, LAW360 (Feb. 14, 2012, 1:50 PM), 
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274. See Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal ¶ 10, United States. v. 
Citigroup, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 5473 (VM) (Feb. 13, 2012); Settlement Agreement ¶ 11, United 
States v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 13 Civ. 0220 (JPC) (Feb. 4, 2014). 
275. Villalpando, supra note 58. 
276. See Matthews, supra note 232 (describing that one co-sponsor of the 1989 law said the 
Justice Department’s new use of FIRREA strays from the law’s intent). 
277. Remarks on Signing the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 
of 1989, supra note 43. 
  
 
 
296 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE          [Vol. 19 
national institutions and even smaller, more regional banks.278 Thus, 
FIRREA is at least relevant to all financial institutions.279 Financial 
institutions may evaluate their exposure to potential FIRREA claims in  
a number of ways.280 They may perform audits of Suspicious Activity 
Reports filed within the previous ten years to assess potential FIRREA 
claims and determine whether any self-reporting measures can be taken 
to limit exposure.281 Additionally, financial institutions should attempt  
to deal with whistleblower complaints internally, especially since most 
whistleblowers report their concerns internally before reporting to the 
government.282 Under FIRREA, a whistleblower is entitled to “20 
percent to 30 percent of any recovery up to the first $1,000,000 
recovered, 10 percent to 20 percent of the next $4,000,000 recovered, 
and 5 percent to 10 percent of the next $5,000,000 recovered,”283 for a 
maximum total reward of $1.6 million.284 Regardless of whether or not 
the $1.6 million is likely to incentivize a high-ranking employee to risk 
his or her lucrative career,285 whistleblowers play key roles  in 
developing strong cases against financial institutions, such as the role 
Edward O’Donnell played in Countrywide.286 
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